The Evolution of Homophily by Fu, Feng et al.
 
The Evolution of Homophily
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Fu, Feng, Martin A. Nowak, Nicholas Alexander Christakis, and
James H. Fowler. 2012. The evolution of homophily. Scientific
Reports 2:845.
Published Version doi:10.1038/srep00845
Accessed February 19, 2015 11:52:19 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10733139
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAThe Evolution of Homophily
Feng Fu
1,2, Martin A. Nowak
2,3,4, Nicholas A. Christakis
1,5,6 & James H. Fowler
7,8
1Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02115, USA,
2Program for Evolutionary Dynamics,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA,
3Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA 02138, USA,
4Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA,
5Department of
Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02115, USA,
6Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA,
7Division of Medical Genetics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093,
USA,
8Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA.
Biologistshavedevotedmuchattentiontoassortativematingorhomogamy,thetendencyforsexualspecies
tomatewithsimilarothers.Incontrast,therehasbeenlittletheoreticalworkonthebroaderphenomenonof
homophily, the tendency for individuals to interact with similar others. Yet this behaviour is also widely
observed in nature. Here, we model how natural selection can give rise to homophily when individuals
engage in social interaction in a population with multiple observable phenotypes. Payoffs to interactions
depend on whether or not individuals have the same or different phenotypes, and each individual has a
preferencethatdetermineshowlikelytheyaretointeractwithothersoftheirownphenotype(homophily)or
of oppositephenotypes(heterophily). Theresults showthat homophily tendstoevolve underawidevariety
of conditions, helping to explain its ubiquity in nature.
H
omophily, the tendency to interact with others of similar type, is widely observed in nature. Sex- and age-
related homophily, for example, shapes the formation of clusters of preferred companionships in zebras
1,
dolphins
2, and predicts both the quantity and quality of many primate interactions
3,4. Meerkats tend to
assortativelyassociatewithothergroupmembersofsimilarattributesindominanceandforagingnetworks
5.And
across many dimensions of phenotypes, humans exhibit high levels of homophily in social tie formation
6–8.I n
fact, recent evidence suggests that humans mayeven exhibit genotypic homophily, meaning that individuals with
a certain genotype are more likely to be friends with others of the same genotype
9.
Heterophily, the tendency to interact with others of different type, also exists in nature at both the cellular
10–12
and organismic levels. For example, research on collaboration networks suggests that people are likely to form
heterophilic task-related ties with those who are complementary to their own skill sets
8. Analogously, hunter-
gatherer life is characterised by long-term imbalances in productivity and consumption, and by the division of
labour
13; hence, one might possibly expect that social interactions would, at least in part, be heterophilic, offering
complementary advantages to interacting parties; but they are not
7.
Indeed, heterophily is far less common than homophily. Much effort has focused on examining the functional
rolehomophilyplaysinawiderangeofdomains,includingsocialsegregation
14,culturalpolarization
15,friendship
formation
16,socialcontagion
17,andtheevolutionofcooperation
18,19.Andtheubiquityofhomophilysuggeststhat
natural selection may favour it. Yet, to our knowledge, there have to date been no attempts to understand the
possibly evolutionary origin of this phenomenon.
Here,weconceptualisethebenefitstohomophilyandheterophilyastheresultsofasimplecoordinationgame.
For example, homophily may yield fitness advantages because individuals using the same mode of communica-
tion may be able to act together more effectively. These advantages are sometimes called synergy. On the other
hand, heterophily may be beneficial because it gives rise to specialisation or gains from trade, such as when a
farmer interacts with a baker
20, when different scientists collaborate
21, or when individuals at different stages in
the life cycle interact
22.
We elaborate asimple model that assigns benefits to interactions and allows individuals to have preferences to
interact with others with similar or different phenotypes. We then let these preferences co-evolve with the set of
availablephenotypes.Thismodelshowsthathomophilyemergesasthedominantpreferenceunderawidevariety
of conditions.
For simplicity, suppose there is a haploid asexual population of size N. There are M possible phenotypes (size,
colour, behaviour, etc.), and each individual i has an observable phenotype denoted by Gi g {1, 2, …, M}. To be
sure the phenotypes do not drive the results, we assume that none of these phenotypes alone make individuals
moreorlessfit;onlycombinationsofphenotypesbetweenindividualsdeterminefitness.Whenindividualsiandj
interact, they obtain a homophilic interaction payoff, a, when they are of the same phenotype (Gi 5 Gj). We can
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SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2 : 845 | DOI: 10.1038/srep00845 1think of this as the payoff to synergy. When i and j are of different
phenotypes (Gi ? Gj), they receive a heterophilic interaction payoff,
b; wecan think of this as the payoff to specialisation. We assume that
when individuals do not interact, their payoff is 0.
We can describe three kinds of environments from this basic set
up. When a . b there is an advantage to homophilic interactions.
When a , b there is an advantage to heterophilic interactions.
Finally, when a 5 b there is no advantage to either homophily or
heterophily.
At each time period, we assume there is a process that allows each
individual to interact with another individual. This process proceeds
in three stages, 1) choose, 2) meet, 3) interact. With probability pi g
[0,1],individualswillchoosetointeract withindividualsof thesame
phenotype(homophily)andwithprobability12pi,theywillchoose
to interact with individuals of different phenotypes (heterophily).
Note that pi 5 1 means that individual i always chooses individuals
of the same phenotype and never of the opposite phenotype (perfect
homophily). Conversely, pi 5 0 means that individual i always
chooses individuals of different phenotypes and never individuals
of the same phenotype (perfect heterophily). And for intermediate
values 0 , pi , 1, individuals show a tendency to favour one kind of
interactionoveranother.Whenpi.0.5,thenindividualitendstobe
homophilic, and when pi , 0.5, individual i tends to be heterophilic.
Next, individuals meet. For simplicity, we assume they are ran-
domly paired with other members of the population (one can ima-
gine more complex assumptions about meeting – we consider this
possibility below). Once they meet, they interact, but only if both
individuals have chosen to initiate an interaction with a partner that
is compatible with their preferences and phenotypes. Hence, the
probability of a successful interaction between two individuals i
and j is pipj if they are of the same phenotype (Gi 5 Gj) and (1 2
pi)(1 2 pj) if they are of different phenotypes (Gi ? Gj).
Results
One advantage of conceptualising homophily in this way is that we
can estimate the average homophilic preference p for several species
and phenotypes in a number of available data sets (Table 1; see also
SI)assuming thatobserved interactionsaresuccessfulmatches.Note
that these real world observations show that homophily (p . 0.5) is
apparent in all cases, with the estimated value ranging between 0.53
and 0.68.
Returning to the model, if we let dij 5 1 when Gi 5 Gj and 0
otherwise, then the expected payoff pij for each interaction is pij 5
dijapipj 1 (12 dij)b(1 2pi)(12 pj). And lettingxl
i be the proportion
of individuals in the population with preference i and phenotype l,
the likelihood of each encounter qij is qij~dij
PM
l~1 xl
ixl
jz 1{dij
  
PM
l~1
PM
r~1,r=l xl
ixr
j. If we let each individual in the population ini-
tiateaninteraction,theaverageexpectedpayofftoindividualiisthen P
j pijqij
 PM
l~1 xl
i.
We assume fitness is an exponential function of payoffs
23, and
individuals reproduce proportional to their fitness according to a
frequency-dependent Moran process
24, which can occur either via
natural selection (the less fit die and are replaced by the more fit), or
learning(thelessfitcopythepreferencesofthemorefit)
25–29.Wealso
allow for mutation. The probability that an offspring changes at
random to one of the M phenotypes (each with equal likelihood) is
v, and in expectation n 5 vN offspring will change. Similarly, the
probability that an offspring changes to a preference drawn from a
uniform distribution with support [0, 1] is u, with m 5 uN offspring
changing in expectation. For full details of the model, please refer to
the SI.
Before discussing the equilibria of the model, we use a simple
example to provide an intuition for why there is an advantage to
homophily. Suppose thereare N1 individuals in group 1 with pheno-
type 1 and N2 in group 2 with phenotype 2. Further suppose that all
individuals within each group have the same preference (p1, p2,
respectively). The payoff to an individual in group 1 is then
aN 1{1 ðÞ p2
1zbN2 1{p1 ðÞ 1{p2 ðÞ
    
N{1 ðÞ , where N 5 N1 1 N2.
Taking two extreme cases, perfect homophilic preferences (p1 5 1)
and perfect heterophilic preferences (p1 5 0), we can see that homo-
philicpreferencesyieldapayoffadvantagetoindividualsingroup1if
a . N2(1 2 p2)b/(N1 2 1). Remarkably, this equation shows that
homophily pays even if the benefit, a, to same type interactions is
lower than the benefit, b, to opposite type interactions. This happens
when group 1 is in the majority (it is easier to connect to a similar
phenotype individual in a larger group) and/or when group 2 is also
homophilic (which reduces the payoff to heterophilic interactions).
Using coalescent theory
30, we derive a closed-form solution for
the limiting distribution of the preferences that survive in the popu-
lation at equilibrium
31,32, and we replicate all predictions with com-
putational simulations. Figure 1 shows an example of three such
equilibria.
When the payoff to homophilic interactions is high, those with a
preferenceforhomophily(highp)aremorecommonthanthosewith
a preference for heterophily. Compared to a population with prefer-
ences distributed uniformly at random, the theory establishes a spe-
cificcritical pointpcabovewhichindividuals arefavouredandbelow
which they are disfavoured by natural selection. When the benefit
to interacting with similar and dissimilar others is more in balance,
a bimodal distribution of preferences emerges with most indivi-
duals strongly preferring either homophilic or heterophilic interac-
tions. Finally, when the payoff to specialisation is high, those with a
preference for heterophily (low p) emerge and are favoured when
they have a preference below a critical point pc.
Table 1 | Empiricalestimatesofhomophilyinsocialnetworksofhumansandotheranimals.Valuesindicatethelikelihoodanindividualwill
seek a social connection with individuals of the same phenotype (. 0.5 indicates a homophilic preference). For example, when choosing a
companionship, dolphins prefer associating with others of the same sex rather than with these of the opposite sex. See SI for methods and
data sources
Species Phenotype Mean homophilic preference SE
Humans(adults, U.S.) sex 0.68 33 10
211
age 0.67 43 10
24
Humans sex 0.54 33 10
212
(children, U.S.) race 0.65 13 10
25
age 0.68 83 10
25
Humans sex 0.59 83 10
212
(adults and children, India) race 0.66 13 10
24
age 0.53 13 10
24
Dolphins sex 0.60 13 10
210
Colobus monkeys sex 0.66 23 10
210
Zebras sex 0.66 13 10
210
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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the theory generates an elegant critical threshold a . Kb that deter-
mineswhethertheaverageindividualinthepopulationwillevolveto
become homophilic. The slope of this threshold is:
K~
nm znz2 ðÞ (M{1Þ
nm znz2 ðÞ z mz2nz3 ðÞ M
,
where M is the number of possible phenotypes, and m and n are
mutation rates that are rescaled by the population size N, m 5 uN
and n 5 vN.
An important implication of this condition is that homophily can
evolve even when the benefit b to heterophily (specialisation) exceeds
the benefit a to homophily (synergy). This happens when K , 1. For
example, Figure 2 shows that decreasing the number of phenotypes in
the population (M), the phenotypic mutation rate (n), or the pref-
erence mutation rate (m), all decrease K and in turn increase the range
of values under which homophily can emerge. Figure 3 shows that the
average individual in the population becomes less homophilic as we
increase each of these three parameters. And, in Figure 4, we show the
full set of conditions under which homophily evolves for a given
population size. We emphasise that homophily evolves even if a =
b as long as the (phenotypic) mutation rates are sufficiently low.
We studied the behaviour of the critical point pc(see SI) and found a
surprisingly strong tendency toward homophily when mutation rates
are low. In fact, when we let both n and m approach 0, the model shows
that natural selection favours all individuals with pw1
  ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
.I no t h e r
words, all homophilic individuals and even those individuals that
weakly prefer heterophily tend to do better than those that strongly
prefer heterophily. And this result is independent of the payoff to
heterophilic interactions, b, and phenotypic diversity, M.T h eo n l y
requirement is that the payoff tohomophilic interactions, a,beposi tiv e.
Givenconstraintsonmobility,itmaybeunrealistictoassumethat
individuals are equally likely to meet with all other members of the
population
7,33.Inmanyspecies(includinghumans)interactionstend
to be more likely between individuals of the same type because they
aredrawntoand/ordrawnfromsimilarenvironments.Wetherefore
extended the basic model by introducing an additional parameter to
allow for such assortativity. With probability 0 , w , 1, individuals
interactwithothersof thesamephenotype,and withprobability 12
w they interact as before (see SI).
Asitturnsout,thisextensiongeneratesanalmostidenticalcritical
threshold,withhomophilyemergingwhena.(12w)Kb.Sincew,
1, this result shows that any degree of assortative matching that
brings similar types into contact with one another more often makes
it even more likely that homophily will evolve.
Another strong assumption of the basic model is that increasing a
preference to interact with individuals of the same phenotype (p)
yields an equal and opposite decrease in the preference to interact
with individuals of different phenotypes (1 2 p). Yet some indivi-
duals might want to interact with both similar and different pheno-
types. We relaxed this assumption by allowing a separate preference
q(independent ofthepreference p)toevolve thatindicatestheprob-
ability that an individual interacts with individuals of different phe-
notypes. Thus, each individual was characterised by a triplet {Gi, pi,
qi} denoting phenotype, homophilic preference, and heterophilic
preference, respectively.
In this extended version of the model (see SI), we found that the
average homophilic preference Æpæ was greater than the average het-
Figure 1 | Equilibrium distribution of homophilic preferences, p, and the networks that result. Solid blue lines in (a), (b), and (c) represent the
theoretical distributions. Arrows show the theoretical critical point pc where the distribution crosses the uniform distribution (i.e., becomes more
common or less common than expected due to chance). (d), (e), display networks of homophilic and heterophilic structures of social relationships that
emergefromcomputersimulationsof(a)and(c),respectively.Parameters:N530,b50.005,M53,u50.04,v50.06,(a,d)a51,b50.1,(b)a55/9,
b 5 1, (c, e) a 5 0.1, b 5 1. Results are averaged over T 5 10
9 time steps.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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that this is exactly the same condition that results from the basic
model. Moreover, under the same condition (a . Kb), the popu-
lation consists of more homophilic individuals (p . q) than the
counterpart, heterophilic ones (p , q). In other words, the popu-
lation tends to show more homophily than heterophily.
Finally, in all models, we assume natural selection is weak, which
means that fitness differences are very small. Increasing the strength
of natural selection relaxes this assumption and magnifies the fitness
difference between traits. As a result, the evolutionary dynamics
become increasingly deterministic, and the critical point pc and the
distribution of preferences in equilibrium become more skewed
towards the extremes (p 5 0 and p 5 1).
Discussion
Our model differs from these prior studies that have taken into
accountassortativityinmatingchoiceorecologicalcompetitioninte-
ractions. Among them, one study
34 concerns whether a particular
assortative mating choice of females is favoured for a fixed com-
position of phenotypes in the population. In this model, the ma-
ting choice is exclusively unilateral and up to females, and the
derived condition only gives the direction of the evolution at a given
Figure 2 | Evolutionarydeterminantsofhomophily. ShownarethepopulationaverageÆpæasafunctionofthepayoffvaluesaandb.Comparedwiththe
base case in (a), decreases in (b) the number of phenotypes, M, (c) the strategy mutation rate, u, and (d) the phenotypic mutation rate, v, always make it
easier for homophily to evolve. For each b value, squares denote the critical a values determined by simulations. The straight lines are the theoretical
predictions.Wefindgoodagreementbetweensimulationresultsandouranalyticaltheory.Parameters:N550,b50.005,(a)M54,u50.06,v50.06,
(b) M 5 2, u 5 0.06, v 5 0.06, (c) M 5 4, u 5 0.01, v 5 0.06, (d) M 5 4, u 5 0.06, v 5 0.02. Results are averaged over T 5 10
8 time steps.
Figure 3 | Population average of homophilic preferences, Æpæ. Shown are the population average Æpæ as a function of (a) the number of phenotypes, M,
(b) the strategy mutation rate, u, and (c) the phenotypic mutation rate, v. The filled circles are simulation results, which agree well with theoretical
predictions (solid lines). As M, u, v increase, the population becomes less homophilic. Parameters: N 5 50, b 5 0.002, a 5 3/4, b 5 1, (a) u 5 0.04, v 5
0.02, (b) M 5 5, v 5 0.02, (c) M 5 5, u 5 0.04. Results are averaged over T 5 5 3 10
8 time steps.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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based on bilateral agreement, individuals’ preferences and pheno-
types are allowed to co-evolve, and most importantly, the mutation-
selection equilibrium is analytically derived that explicitly accounts
for the abundance of any homophilic trait in the long run evolution.
Some other previous studies, for example, consider the role of pre-
existing assortative competition, but rather than the emergence of
assortativity per se, in asexual
35 or sexual
36 selection contexts.
Complementingandstrengthening thesepriorworks
34–36,ourmodel
here explicitly addresses how homophily evolves in the first place.
Furthermore, our evolutionary model shows how homophily can
emerge under a wide variety of conditions, particularly when muta-
tion rates are low. It is not surprising that the payoff to homophilic
interactions must be high relative to the payoff to heterophilic inter-
actions in order for homophily to evolve. However, the analysis also
suggests that this relationship is only relative, since the threshold for
theratiobetweenthesebenefitscanbelessthanone.Thismeansthat
synergymayhaveapowerfuleffectonevolution,evenwhenthereare
substantial benefits to specialization, helping to explain the ubiquity
of homophily in nature. In higher-order species, the emergence of
language or other forms of communication, or of certain cognitive
capacities, might serve such a function, and may help to promote a
general tendency to seek out similar individuals with whom to coop-
erate or interact.
The model also shows that even small advantages to synergy can
significantly reduce phenotypic diversity. Heterophilic populations
maintain diversity by privileging rare phenotypes, generally causing
their distribution to become uniform. Homophilic populations, on
the other hand, privilege common phenotypes, helping to drive
alternativephenotypestoextinction.Even ifallphenotypesarethem-
selvesfitnessneutral(astheyareinourmodel),advantagestosynergy
will tend to yield populations dominated by a single phenotype, and
in the long run the population will tend to oscillate from one dom-
inant phenotype to another, with rapid phasetransitions in between.
Our results may also shed light on the observation that evolution
in humans is accelerating
37. The human capacity to collaborate not
only with kin but also with unrelated members of our species may
have dramatically increased the potential gains from synergy, and
this shift in payoffs would not only favour interactions with similar
partners, but would also affect the overall desire to search out such
partners. A wide variety of studies suggest that humans particularly
seekoutsimilarothers
6,38,evenwhentherearenoobviousbenefitsto
these interactions
39 (on the contrary, there may be more benefits to
specialisation). Hence, it is possible that we evolved a strong pre-
dilection for homophily once we started to interact frequently with
unrelated individuals. Such an effect would especially accelerate the
evolution of phenotypes that are intrinsically synergistic, such as
those related to communication or other collaborative activities.
Here, we focus on only one phenotypic dimension, but it is pos-
sible to extend our model to multiple dimensions of phenotypes (see
SI). Payoffs to synergy and specialisation may vary for different sets
of phenotypes, as each set serves a different function in social inter-
actions. Therefore, multi-layer networks superimposed on various
types of social interactions could result, and each layer could play a
different role. It is possible that in one layer ‘similarity attracts’,
leading to stable, long-term relationships
6, while in another layer
Figure 4 | Thefullsetofconditionsunderwhichhomophilyevolves. Thecoloured3Dregionsin(a),(c)showthecombinationsofparameters(m,n,M)
that allow natural selection to favour homophily for given payoff values: (a) a 5 3/4, b 5 1 and (c) a 5 1/10, b 5 1. Corresponding to (a) and (c)
respectively,theshadedareasin(b),(d)denotethesetofparameters(m,n)favouringhomophilywiththenumberofphenotypes,M52.Theboundaries
of these shaded areas shrink to the dashed red lines, as M increases to ‘. Homophily evolves even if a = b, as long as the mutation rates are low.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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ties
8. In this way, natural selection could lead to the delicate, if very
lopsided, balance between homophily and heterophily that we
observe today in the real world.
Methods
In the Supplementary Information, we elaborate on the model presented above and
analyse it, characterising equilibria under mutation-selection, explaining selection
criteria, deriving a formula for continuous preferences, and showing long form
equations for the triplet correlations at neutrality that allow us to use coalescent
theorytoderiveconditions fortheevolutionofhomophily.Wethendescribe howwe
derived the critical slopes and critical preferences shown in the main text, and
characteriseequilibriaforthewholeparameterspace.Finally,weturnourattentionto
several extensions of the model, analytically characterising models with biased
matching, local mutation, strong selection, full strategy space, and multiple sets of
phenotypes.
We also describe the application of the model to derive estimates of homophily
from empirical data, as shown in Table 1.
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